Social norms of cooperation are studied under several forms of communication. In an experiment, strangers could make public statements before playing a prisoner's dilemma. The interaction was repeated indefinitely, which generated multiple equilibria. Communication could be used as a tool to either signal intentions to coordinate on Pareto-superior outcomes, to deceive others, or to credibly commit to actions. Some forms of communication did not promote the incidence of efficient Nash play, and sometimes reduced it. Surprisingly, cooperation suffered when subjects could publicly commit to actions.
Introduction
Communication has a positive connotation in economics. Behavioral economists have shown that non-binding pre-play communication can be a powerful tool to coordinate actions and to promote welfare in social dilemmas (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992) . This study is an experiment on if and how communication can promote the emergence of social norms of cooperation when subjects do not know the reputation of others. It examines the use of several communication technologies as a tool to either signal intentions to coordinate on Pareto-superior outcomes, to deceive others, or to build trust by credibly committing to actions. 3 Our paper differs from the above because it studies an indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma in economies of four subjects who can communicate in each period, and have also incentives to send deceptive messages. Unlike the indefinitely repeated game in Cason and Mui (2010) , where only a subset of players could exchange messages, our communication game is symmetric. Unlike the finitely repeated games in Wilson and Sell (1997) and in Duffy and Feltovich (2006) , the efficient outcome is a theoretical equilibrium in our experimental economies. Unlike Cooper and Kuhn (2010) , where the reduced-form adopted implies subjects act as if committing to strategies in the continuation game, our design explicitly encompasses indefinite duration; this allows subjects to choose from a much wider set of strategies and retains the fundamental coordination difficulties that characterize the continuation game in indefinitely repeated social dilemmas. In addition, subjects cannot send a private message to their opponent before play but can only send a public message of 7 proposed play to the entire economy. After observing all messages in the economy subjects randomly meet their opponent to play the prisoner's dilemma.
With respect to deception uses of communication, our study is closer to Cooper and Kuhn (2010) , because the Pareto-efficient outcome is an equilibrium but players may choose to deceive because their interests are not perfectly aligned. This contrasts with deception in the social dilemmas in Wilson and Sell (1997) and Duffy and Feltovich (2006) , where the unique equilibrium is defection. In addition, our design incorporates a structured communication protocol that includes both a common language suggestive of actions (explicit messages), as well as language that is not common (neutral messages). This helps detecting and quantifying a deceptive use of communication. Finally, our design introduces a mechanism to study whether the ability to make binding promises enhances the effectiveness of communication in achieving superior outcomes.
Experimental Design and Theoretical Considerations
There are five treatments that differ in the availability and characteristics of the communication means available. The treatments are No-communication, Messages, Multiple Messages, Pledge, and Chat (Table 2) . Stage game, continuation probability, and matching protocols were identical across treatments. In particular, the efficient outcome is a sequential equilibrium in all treatments. We first present the No-communication treatment. The other treatments, which will be later described, include an additional communication stage.
The stage game is a standard prisoner's dilemma with payoffs determined according to A supergame or cycle (as it was called in the experiment) consists of an indefinite interaction among subjects achieved by a random continuation rule in the footsteps of Roth and Murninghan (1978) . A supergame that has reached a period continues into the next with probability δ = 0.95, so the interaction is of finite but uncertain duration. The continuation probability δ is interpreted as the discount factor of a risk-neutral subject. The expected duration of a supergame is 1/(1-)=20 periods, and in each period the supergame is expected to go on for 19 additional periods. In the experiment at the end of each period the computer drew a random integer between 1 and 100, using a uniform distribution, and showed it to all session participants. The supergame terminated with a draw of 96 or of a higher number.
Before taking an action, subjects could observe all past actions taken in their economy, but could not see individual histories. A table on the screen listed everyone's actions in random order, period by period. Subjects could identify neither their current nor their past opponents. That is to say, subjects could not use strategies based on reputation. However, the parameterization selected guarantees that the efficient outcome is a sequential equilibrium in all treatments because subjects can use the threat of economy-wide defection to police deviations from cooperation. For a proof of this claim and further details we refer the reader to the analysis in the anonymous public monitoring treatment in Camera and Casari (2009) .
Each experimental session involved twenty subjects and five cycles. We built twenty-five economies in each session by creating five groups of four subjects in each of the five cycles.
In every cycle each economy included only subjects who had neither been part of the same economy in previous cycles nor were part of the same economy in subsequent cycles.
Subjects did not know how groups were created but were informed that no two participants 9 ever interacted together for more than one cycle. This matching protocol across supergames is important to minimize the possibility of contagious effects. In our study each subject played five supergames so that subjects may have indirectly shared a common past opponent only after the second supergame.
For the whole duration of a cycle subjects were randomly matched in pairs in each period and interacted exclusively with the other three members of their economy. At the beginning of each period of the cycle, the economy was randomly divided into two pairs in such a way that each subject had one third probability of meeting any of the three other participants in her economy. By design, cycles for all economies terminated simultaneously.
All 180 subjects were recruited through e-mail and in-class-announcements. The sessions were run at Purdue University's VSEEL lab. No eye contact was possible among subjects.
Instructions were read aloud with copies on all desks. A copy of the instructions is in the Appendix. Average earnings were $23.90. A session lasted on average 88 periods for a running time of about 3 hours, including instruction reading and a quiz. Each session had 20 participants and 5 cycles.
Treatments
In treatments Messages, Multiple Messages, Pledge and Chat, subjects had the opportunity of sending a public message. We allowed subjects to communicate in the first period of the cycle and then also during the course of the supergame. In this manner communication not only can have the role of signalling intention but can also have a reassuring role (see the discussion in Crawford, 1998) . Messages where simultaneously made public and in some treatments repeated rounds of communication occurred before playing the stage game (Table 2) . This was done because previous results suggest that repeated rounds of communication help subjects achieve a consensus on messages (Blume and Ortmann, 2007) .
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In all treatments, interactions and communication were anonymous. Communication was free-form in the Chat treatment; it was structured in all other treatments, as described below.
Nocommunication

Messages
Multiple Messages
Pledge Chat
Communication frequency
n/a Every period Every 4 periods Every 4 periods Every 4
periods
Message space n/a "Y", "Z," or "not sure"
4 iterations of "Y", "Z," or "not sure"
"Y", "Z" or "not sure"
Freeform text
Auditing
n/a n/a n/a Camera and Casari (2009) Messages treatment. In every period there was a pre-play communication stage, called the "suggestions stage" in the instructions. Each subject had the opportunity to suggest a play ("Y," "Z," or "not sure") for everyone in the economy for the current period, by making a message public, at no cost. A message included three parts: a suggestion ("Y," "Z," or "not sure") for the subject herself, for her anonymous match, and for everyone else. 4 Subjects were informed that the suggestion stage gave them the opportunity to suggest choice Y or Z for themselves, for their match, and for everyone else in their economy. If subjects wanted to avoid sending a specific suggestion Y or Z, then they could leave all options to "not sure,"
which was the default message. Because the mapping between a "Y" or "Z" message and the corresponding actions is clear, we refer to those as explicit messages. Instead, we refer to "Not sure" as a neutral message, to which different subjects could attach a different meaning.
Therefore, communication is based on a restricted language that is common only in part.
When choosing what action to take in the prisoner's dilemma game, subjects could see on their screen everyone's messages. In keeping with the strict anonymous protocol of the experiment, the sender of the message was not identifiable.
Multiple Messages treatment.
Subjects entered the pre-play communication stage at the beginning of period one, and then every four periods. To help subjects achieve a consensus on the messages and to facilitate coordination on play, in the communication stage each subject had repeated opportunities to make a message public, at no cost. The structure of the message was as in the Messages treatment, although the communication stage comprised four separate steps. In step one, each subject sent the three-part message described in the Messages treatment ("Y," "Z," or "not sure"). In step two, first subjects saw on their screen all messages sent in step one by everyone in the economy, and then had the opportunity to revise their step-one message. Steps three and four followed the same procedure. That is to say, subjects had three separate opportunities to revise their message after seeing the messages of others. After their third and last revision, subjects could see on their screen all messages by everyone in the economy, before choosing their action in the Prisoner's dilemma. Once again, the sender of the message was never identifiable during this communication process. No losses were incurred by subjects who selected the neutral message "not sure" for themselves, and by subjects whose choices and suggestions (for themselves) were concordant. If at least one person in the economy chose to audit, then at the end of the period everyone in the economy could see how many subjects incurred a loss.
Chat treatment. Subjects entered the pre-play communication stage at the beginning of period one, and then every four periods. Communication was free-form and took place through a chat box that remained open for two minutes. 5 In sending messages, subjects were instructed to be civil to one another, not to use profanities, and not to identify themselves in any manner. Each sender of the chat message was identified by a number which changed every period, to avoid direct identification of subjects during the communication stage. 
Theoretical considerations
Our design admits multiple equilibria, ranging from full defection to the efficient outcome. This result follows from the folk theorem extension to matching games in Kandori
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(1992) and Ellison (1994) . Given that there is public monitoring of actions in the economy, the efficient outcome can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium for all discount factors greater than 0.25. For risk-neutral agents, the discount factor in the experiment corresponds to the continuation probability, i.e., 0.95. The proof is built around the conjecture that everyone employs a social norm of cooperation based on the following trigger strategy: subjects start period one cooperating and keep cooperating as long they do not observe defections. If a defection is observed in the economy, then subjects defect forever. See the analysis of anonymous public monitoring in Camera and Casari (2009) .
Several remarks are in order. First, the introduction of structured communication in the
Messages, Multiple Messages and Pledge treatments, and of free-form communication in the
Chat treatment does not remove the multiplicity of equilibria that exists in the indefinitely repeated game without communication. Indeed, subject can simply choose to ignore any message received.
Second, in contrast to the Chat, structured communication imposes important constraints:
it does not allow conveying individual histories, strategies, approval or disapproval. In particular, with structured communication subjects cannot convey explicit threats for defections, which is crucial when incentives to behave opportunistically exist. Hence, despite the fact that actions Y and Z are both part of a sequential equilibrium, structured messages are not necessarily credible (see the discussion in Farrell and Rabin, 1996) . To fix ideas, a subject who is following an "always defect" strategy may send a message Y simply to induce her opponent to cooperate. That is to say, structured messages are not necessarily self-signaling and self-committing and can be outright deceptive. Hence, to quantify the incidence of deception through structured communication, our design includes the possibility to send messages with a common meaning (an explicit message, reflecting an action label) as well as a message without a common meaning (the neutral message "not sure").
14 Third, in the Pledge treatment deception could be eliminated entirely through auditing.
Subjects had the option to activate an institution ensuring messages are self-committing. If someone audited, then the sender of a Y or Z message had a sufficient incentive to behave accordingly, because auditing imposed significant losses on those subjects found to having behaved inconsistently. Sending a message of cooperation and then defecting gave a subject at most 30 points (if the opponent cooperated) minus 10 points of sanction. In short, the Pledge treatment removes the incentive to send deceptive messages, and so it gives us the possibility to investigate whether institutions that eliminate deception from communication are helpful in solving repeated social dilemmas.
Results
We report six main results. These outcomes hold also when considering coordination on cooperation within an economy, or measuring cooperation through a probit regression ( (p-value: 0.1046, n1=50, n2=150) . 2,3,4,5, 6-10, 11-20, 21-30 Table 4 , column 1 reports the results from a probit regression that explains the individual choice to cooperate (1) or not (0) using treatment dummies and other regressors that control for fixed effects (cycles, periods within the cycle, duration of the previous cycle). The availability of structured communication is associated to a decrease in the cooperation rate for the representative subject, which is significant at one percent level in the Pledge and
Result 1: Structured communication did not significantly raise cooperation relative to Nocommunication. In contrast, free-form communication supports almost full cooperation.
Figure 1: Cooperation rates by treatment
Messages treatments and not significant in the Multiple Messages treatment. 8 We confirm that the effect of chat on cooperation is strong, which is not unusual in the literature (Cooper and Kuhn, 2010) .
The novel aspect of Result 1 is that communication is sometimes detrimental to cooperation even when cooperation is part of a Nash equilibrium. Theory suggests that, at worst, cheap talk communication may be ineffective where messages may not be credible (Aumann, 1990) . In line with theory, previous empirical evidence on structured communication documented that, in coordination games, it generally promotes coordination on the Pareto-efficient outcome, especially if the game is repeated (Blume and Ortmann, 2007) . In our experiment repeated communication opportunities did not promote efficient Nash play, and sometimes worse outcomes were reached than with no communication. 8 The difference in cooperation rates between No-communication and Messages is significant according to the probit regression in Table 4 (col.1) but not according to the above non-parametric test. While in the regression one observation is a single choice by a subject in a period, in the test it is the average choice in an economy. As a consequence, the regression gives more weights to longer cycles.
Similar findings for structured communication are reported in finitely repeated social dilemma experiments where, however, cooperation is not part of a Nash equilibrium (Wilson and Sell, 1997, Duffy and Feltovich, 2006) .
Result 2:
The possibility of renegotiation did not significantly reduce initial cooperation.
Periodic opportunities to communicate offer the possibility to re-coordinate on cooperation after a failed attempt ("renegotiate"). This would not be the case if communication could take place only once at the beginning of the cycle. The possibility of renegotiation weakens the credibility of punishment threats for deviation from a cooperative strategy. Hence, theory predicts lower initial cooperation rates in treatments with communication than without (e.g., VanDamme, 1989, Abreu, Pierce, and Stacchetti, 1993 Messages, and Pledge treatment (Mann-Whitney test, n1=n2=50, p-value>0.10). Table 4 , column 2 provides further supports for Result 2. Results from a probit regression explaining the individual choices in period 1 always highlight no significant decrease in initial cooperation, and a significant increase in some treatments. This does not support the conjecture that the possibility to renegotiate lowers initial cooperation rates. Result 2 answers a methodological question raised in Cooper and Kuhn (2010) about the possibility of studying collusion in finitely repeated games to draw inference on infinitely repeated games.
We report that some of their main results on the effects of communication still hold in an indefinitely repeated setting. In particular, we confirm that the possibility of renegotiation is not detrimental to cooperation, as opposed to a no-communication setting.
Result 3: Structured messages signaled intentions: subjects tended to act in accordance with
their own messages. Moreover, subjects' choices were affected by others' messages. Table 5 ).
In all treatments, there is coherence at the individual level between the statements made public and choices subsequently taken. Recall that there is no direct cost from choosing an action different from the message sent. Only in the Pledge treatment the possibility of being audited introduces such a cost as an endogenous possibility.
In the Messages treatment, while a subject who publicly signaled her intention to cooperate (message "Y") did cooperate in 64.1% of periods immediately following communication, a subject who signaled defection (message "Z") cooperated only in 7.1% of cases (Table 5 ). In the Multiple Messages and Pledge treatments there is an even stronger coherence between messages sent and subsequent choices. As a consequence, subjects could rely on public statements made by others about their intended play to forecast behavior in the economy. Our data show that actions are a function of the type of messages seen. 
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The probit regression in Table 4 , column 3 interacts the treatment dummies with a variable measuring the number of cooperative messages sent by other subjects in the period. Results confirm that the greater is the number of cooperative messages observed, the higher is the cooperation rate for the representative subject. In addition, the regression shows that the lack of messages signaling the intention to cooperate was taken as a signal of the intention to defect. If others did not make public their intention to cooperate, then cooperation was lower in treatments with structured communication than the treatment without communication. This finding supports the interpretation that sending a public message of cooperation was perceived as signaling truthfully the intention of the sender.
All this evidence suggests that the lack of public messages of cooperation was interpreted as a lukewarm desire to coordinate on cooperation, whereas the presence of cooperative messages was interpreted as a strong desire for coordination on cooperation. This explains why high levels of cooperation are observed when many cooperative messages are made public, and low levels of cooperation emerge otherwise. Because in the experiment messages were informative, they shaped beliefs. From Result 3, one can conjecture that the more cooperative messages were made public, the stronger was the belief that a social norm of cooperation could be supported. This means that subjects could make several uses of communication. The socially desirable, or benevolent, use of communication is to help coordination on cooperation by reinforcing the belief that the sender of a cooperative message will cooperate. However, there is also a socially undesirable use of communication. Subjects could behave deceptively by sending a cooperative message to reinforce the belief in a cooperative outcome while intending to defect.
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Figure 2: Neutral messages
The data provide evidence on these conflicting uses of public messages. Based on the messages sent and observed, in the data there exist cases in which one can quantify a lower bound for the incidence of deceptive and benevolent use of communication in the experiment.
For this purpose, we define two types of subjects. A deceptive subject is someone who, at least once during the cycle, signaled her intention to cooperate, observed that everyone else also shared a similar intention, and defected the period immediately following such communication. A benevolent subject either cooperated in all those periods of a cycle when all other subjects signaled the intention to cooperate; or cooperated in all periods of a cycle when she made public her intention to cooperate. Clearly, not all subjects fall into one of 23 these two types because either subjects behaved differently or never faced a situation in which they could behave deceptively or benevolently. informative. The crux of the matter is that there were subjects who made a deceptive use of communication. Deception diluted the meaningfulness of the observed public messages of cooperation, and reduced the value of making public the intention to cooperate. Table 6 provides further support for Result 4. In a probit regression, we explain the cooperation actions (0=defect, 1=cooperate) using as independent variables the messages made public in the economy, controlling for period effects, cycle order and duration. Subjects were not always more likely to cooperate when they observed several cooperative messages.
A subject who sent a cooperative message was more likely to cooperate when two or three others signaled their intention to cooperate, and the effect was highly significant in all three treatments. This supports the view that communication was used to foster coordination on a social norm of cooperation. On the other hand, subjects who did not send a cooperative message, and also observed at least two cooperative messages were less likely to cooperate in 9 We cannot say whether a subject is deceptive if she never sends a cooperative message and observes three cooperative messages in the period. We cannot say whether a subject is benevolent if she never sent a cooperative message and she never observed three cooperative messages from the others. Hence, we have less than 200 observations per treatment that we can use to classify subjects as deceptive or benevolent type.
24
the Messages and Multiple Messages treatments. This is evidence that some subjects used communication in an opportunistic way. The regression also provides evidence that the possibility to audit the consistency between actions and messages removed the incentives to make a deceptive use of communication opportunities and effectively introduced the possibility of individual commitment as a way to build trust. In the Pledge treatment, subjects who signaled a cooperative intention were 25 significantly more likely to cooperate even when no one else publicly signaled their intention to cooperate. Moreover, subjects who did not signal their intention to cooperate, also raised their cooperation level when they observed cooperative messages, albeit to a lesser extent due to the presence of opportunistic subjects.
Finally, the regression provides support for the view that neutral messages "not sure" had a negative connotation. In the Multiple Messages treatment, subjects who publicly signaled a cooperative intention and saw that less than two other subjects did the same, were less likely to cooperate than subjects who did not send a cooperative message. We know also that very few subjects sent explicit signals of defection (message Z).
Result 5: In the Pledge treatment, there was no deceptive use of communication thanks to the extensive use of auditing. Defectors paid to audit more often than cooperators.
The Pledge treatment substantially altered communication patterns. It increased the information content of communication (Result 3). The opportunity to audit transformed structured communication from cheap-talk into a form of public and unilateral commitment device, i.e., a credible pledge. A subject who sent a message signaling a cooperative intention, and then defected, suffered a loss if someone in the economy audited. As a consequence, the use of auditing removed the incentives to use communication deceptively, but it also exposed subjects who publicly "pledged" cooperation to the risk of being exploited by those uninterested in coordinating on the efficient outcome. Sending a public message of cooperation could be particularly risky because the pledge lasted for four periods. As a result, deception disappeared because of lack of cooperative pledges: a large fraction of explicit messages were simply replaced by neutral messages (Figure 2 ). The net effect was that coordination on cooperation declined relative to the no-communication treatment (Table 4) .
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On average, someone audited in 44.6% of periods, which is evidence that subjects desired to have a commitment technology. Paying one point to audit can be seen as an investment aimed at ensuring that those who signaled a cooperative intention were indeed committed to cooperation. As a result the truthfulness of messages increased in the Pledge treatment (Table   5 ). However, commitment could be used in one of two ways. To facilitate coordination on cooperation by assuring that others would also cooperate, i.e., by building trust that others are committed to cooperation. Or to facilitate rent extraction, which instead reduces trust in the cooperative efforts of others. 10 Table 7 provides evidence for both uses of auditing.
Cooperators who sent a cooperative message were responsible for 33.9% of auditing requests while defectors who sent a neutral message were responsible for 46.2% of auditing requests.
This evidence supports the view that introducing a mechanism to transform public statements into binding promises did not make it easier to implement a social norm of cooperation.
Through auditing cooperators were simply kept hostage by defectors. Evidence for Result 6 is given by the regressions in Table 8 . We regress the average profit in each economy on the average number of public statements that were explicit about the sender's intended play ("Y" or "Z" messages "for oneself"), controlling for cycle order and length. Table 8 : OLS regression where the dependent variable is profits; the unit of observation is an economy. For the Pledge treatment the dependent variable is gross profits, i.e., fees and costs associated to auditing are not removed from the total. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Subject
In the Messages treatment, the regression exhibits a significantly positive association between the messages sent to signal own play and the profit in the economy. In the Pledge treatment there was a significantly positive association between the message sent to suggest play to others and the profit in the economy. These effects are positive but not significant in the Multiple Messages treatment. To the extent that public messages were used to signal intentions of play to everyone else in the economy, these findings suggest that different communication technologies were used in different ways to implement a social norm of cooperation. In particular, in the Pledge treatment making binding promises of play did not help to increase profits because of the exploitative use of auditing made by defectors; instead, subjects relied on a more indirect way to signal their cooperative intention by using nonbinding promises, i.e., by suggesting the cooperative action to others. Contrary to the conjecture in Wilson and Sell (1997) , augmenting a public communication technology in such a way that a message effectively amounts to a strong pledge, is not helpful in improving aggregate welfare in repeated social dilemmas.
Discussion and conclusions
The experimental literature has demonstrated that pre-play communication promotes social efficiency in a variety of settings, even when the socially efficient outcome is not a Nash equilibrium. One would expect cheap-talk to have a similar or even more beneficial impact in settings where the socially efficient outcome is a theoretical equilibrium, albeit one that is empirically infrequently observed (Camera and Casari, 2009 
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As in most papers with structured communication, the experiment includes a treatment in which subjects simultaneously send a message before choosing their action (Messages treatment). However, we also study the case when subjects can revise multiple times their public message after observing the messages of everyone else and before deciding on their action (Multiple Messages treatment). Given the underlying uncertainty about others' strategies, having the opportunity to revise messages to achieve consensus should foster the emergence of a social norm of cooperation. If communication is primarily used to facilitate coordination on the efficient outcome, then we would expect higher cooperation rates in
Multiple Messages than in Messages. On the contrary, we report that cooperation rates in the two treatments did not differ.
Talk being cheap, it is perhaps the credibility of messages that makes communication ineffective in raising cooperation rates. In the Pledge treatment subjects could solve credibility problems. Through auditing, anyone could verify the concordance of messages sent with actions subsequently taken. If auditing occurred, then those who broke their pledge were sanctioned. Auditing introduced the possibility of voluntary individual commitment. If making binding promises public is valuable to build trust, then one would expect a higher cooperation rate in the Pledge than in the Messages treatment. On the contrary, we report that cooperation significantly fell.
With our design we can also detect whether the use of communication is benevolent or deceptive, and quantify the relative incidence. Deception, i.e., falsely signaling intentions, can be the reason why structured communication is ineffective. We report that the prevalent use of communication was benevolent, but there was also a substantial use of deception, especially in the Messages treatment where around 42% of subjects sent at least one deceptive message. The possibility to make a pledge eliminated deception, but it did so at the expense of crowding-out explicit communication. In the Pledge treatment explicit messages 31 were much more informative because a subject's pledge to cooperate was fulfilled 89% of the times. However this also reduced the volume of explicit messages because subjects who pledged cooperation were easy targets for opportunistic defectors. Hence, subjects switched to sending neutral messages. Moreover, sending a binding public message amounted to being the first mover in a game, which lowered the usefulness of communication, as the sender of the message could not react to the messages later observed. In sum, contrary to the conjecture in Wilson and Sell (1997) Our findings for structured communication mirror some of the results obtained in finitely repeated social dilemmas, where cheap-talk can have no impact or even a negative impact on social welfare (Wilson and Sell, 1997, Duffy and Feltovich, 2006) . This suggests that the same behavioral mechanism tied to communication in finitely repeated games-where only defection is an equilibrium-is also present when the game is indefinitely repeated, where cooperation is also an equilibrium. In a way, it is surprising that the behavioral impact of structured communication is unaffected by the change in equilibrium set, especially because of the associated introduction of a non-trivial coordination problem. Only in the chat treatment communication played a positive role. Perhaps the possibility to convey strategies and verbally punish defectors helped the implementation of a social norm of cooperation.
